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ABSTRACT 
The Navy currently operates three F-35C squadrons, who have recently faced 
readiness challenges due to maintenance downtime. The current readiness levels attained 
to date will not suffice when the platform embarks on its first deployment in 2021. These 
readiness shortfalls prompted the authors to complete a Pareto analysis to determine 
the top maintenance-related degraders by the type of maintenance involved. 
Subsequently, the authors utilized process improvement tools to assess the efficiency 
of the current maintenance processes and investigated areas that could benefit 
from the authors’ analysis. The authors make recommendations to implement 
parallel maintenance processes and standardize the administrative documentation 
procedures, which have the potential to reduce maintenance downtime, increase 
aircraft readiness, and facilitate a means to perform more robust future aviation 
maintenance process analyses. 
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The F-35C is the Navy's newest strike fighter aircraft that faces readiness 
challenges as the aircraft becomes operational. As the F-35C program develops out of 
infancy, the authors realize the importance of solving readiness challenges before the 
aircraft develops into full-rate production. The reason for the author’s analysis is that the 
F-35C aircraft is spending too much time in maintenance, which effects the readiness of 
the F-35C aircraft. The authors focus on which maintenance tasks consume the most 
maintenance hours, and what process improvements can be done to reduce maintenance 
time to increase the readiness of the F-35C aircraft.  
A. METHODOLOGY 
The authors use analysis techniques to identify top maintenance degraders that 
accumulate the most maintenance downtime. Once the maintenance degraders were 
identified, the authors will use process improvement techniques to identify the bottleneck 
in the maintenance processes to reduce the cycle time associated with aircraft maintenance.  
The maintenance data was collected from Strike Fighter Squadron 147 (VFA-147) 
at Naval Air Station Lemoore, California. The authors collected all recorded maintenance 
actions for the F-35C aircraft assigned to the squadron over the period of October 2018 to 
August 2019. The maintenance actions from all reporting aircraft were listed in a 
spreadsheet with the associated elapsed maintenance times and total maintenance man-
hours for each maintenance action. The authors used a Pareto ABC analysis to identify the 
maintenance actions that comprised the most amount of maintenance man-hours from 
October 2018 to August 2019. The maintenance actions that consumed the most 
maintenance time were listed as top degraders. The top degraders were listed in an overall 
analysis then broken into groups of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance.  
The authors used fishbone analysis to find cause and effect for each maintenance 
process. The cause and effect analysis helped the authors narrow down the focus on the 
bottlenecks in each process. The authors then used process flow charts to break each 
process down by step with associated average maintenance times, which were calculated 
xvi 
from the maintenance data. The process flow analysis allowed the authors to locate 
bottlenecks for each process and recommend changes to reduce maintenance time and 
increase capacity. 
B. KEY FINDINGS 
The top degraders for the aircraft were broken into two categories; preventive 
maintenance and corrective maintenance. The top degrader for preventive maintenance was 
the Post Operations Servicing (POS). POS accumulated 1,121 total maintenance hours 
which was the focus for process improvement of preventive maintenance actions. The top 
degrader for the corrective maintenance category was tire removal and replacement. Tire 
maintenance accumulated a total of 433 maintenance hours and would be the focus for our 
corrective maintenance process improvement. 
Through process flow analysis, the authors identified a bottleneck in the 
maintenance process. POS maintenance could benefit from utilizing maintenance 
manpower capacity to its fullest extent. The authors found a potential decrease in 
maintenance time by adding additional maintenance personnel to the process and 
recommend a parallel process of maintenance steps to reduce total time.  
The authors used process flow charts to look at the tire removal and replacement 
process to determine the bottleneck within that process. The tire maintenance process 
shows that the removal step is the bottleneck due to the longest mean time to completion. 
Although the maintenance step does show a bottleneck, the authors find that the tire 
removal and replacement are on par for other models of strike fighter aircraft.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Leverage Available Manpower  
The authors observed an opportunity to reduce maintenance cycle times by 
maximizing the use of available manpower capacity. Specifically, the authors recommend 
the utilization of seven maintenance technicians per aircraft working in parallel processes 
when conducting a Post Operations Servicing inspection. By doing so, the authors 
calculated a potential reduction of 43.9% in the cycle time per occurrence.  
xvii 
2. Develop Standard Operating Procedures 
Having a standardized administrative completion process for all organizations 
operating the F-35C will facilitate the means to conduct a more meaningful process 
improvement analysis. Of all organizations the authors observed, they noted that every 
organization was consolidating and documenting a specific maintenance action 
consistently different. The authors recommend the Type Wing responsible for the F-35C 
to standardize documentation procedures for the identified maintenance actions that have 
the most impact on readiness. By doing so, they will enable a more accurate representation 
of the maintenance processes being performed and will be able to identify and mitigate the 
bottlenecks in those time-intensive maintenance actions. 
3. Reevaluate Tolerances 
The top degrader the authors identified in corrective maintenance was removing 
and replacing both nose and main landing gear tires on the F-35C. Due to the relatively 
high frequency of tire changes observed by the authors, it is recommended that the 
evaluation criteria for the allowable wear limits on both nose and main landing gear tires 
be reevaluated in order to reduce the frequency of tire removal and replacements 
potentially. If the current evaluation criteria are found to be conservative, both an increase 
in readiness and cost savings will be achieved with updated allowable wear limits.     
4. Develop a Means to Measure Squadron Maintenance Performance 
When the authors began their research, they sought out a baseline for the time 
required to complete specific maintenance actions. They discovered that Joint Service 
Technical Data (JTD) did not provide estimated times required to perform a specific 
maintenance action. The absence of this information does not allow an F-35C squadron's 
maintenance leadership the ability to measure their maintenance processes in terms of 
efficiency and effectiveness. The methodology the authors used to develop the average 
times associated with necessary maintenance provides this metric based on historical data 
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The United States Navy officially added its first fifth-generation squadron of F-35C 
Lightning II aircraft to its arsenal when it declared initial operational capability in February 
2019. The F-35C is part of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program developed for the United 
States military. The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force all have different variations 
of the JSF. To promote the concept of Joint operations, the three service branches with 
fixed-wing aircraft desired a fifth-generation fighter. The three service branches each 
require a different variation of the JSF.  
The United States Air Force operates the F-35A variant. The United States Marine 
Corps operates the F-35B short take-off and land variation. The United States Navy 
operates the F-35C which is designed for operations on aircraft carriers. Each variation of 
the JSF has characteristics designed to meet criteria for each specific service branch. The 
F-35C is specifically designed with a large wing and increased fuel capacity for operation 
on the open seas. While the aircraft are considered familiar, there are complex differences 
with each aircraft making maintenance on each unique to the service branch variation.  
The F-35C is located at Naval Air Station (NAS) Lemoore. NAS Lemoore is the 
strike fighter master base for all west coast naval aviation. The F-35C will supplement, and 
eventually replace, the aging F/A-18 fleet with new capabilities offered by the fifth-
generation fighter. NAS Lemoore provides a strategic location for the transition to F-35C 
with the training squadron, Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 125 is also located at NAS 
Lemoore. VFA-125’s mission is to train the future pilots of the F-35C. The dual location 
of VFA-125 and the new F-35C operational squadrons, like VFA-147 offer a smooth 
transition of new operators, and an easy transfer of information between the trainers and 
operators.  
B. PROBLEM 
The addition of this fifth-generation asset has brought the Navy significant higher 
operational capabilities. However, those capabilities have come with several new support 
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challenges that have resulted in low full mission capable readiness levels and levels below 
the 80% mission requirements for squadrons operating out of Naval Air Station Lemoore, 
California. 80% mission-capable aircraft is a requirement mandated by the Secretary of 
Defense and requires all squadrons to have 80% of their reporting aircraft ready for 
missions (Mehta, 2018, par. 4). 
Our objective throughout the entirety of this research is to analyze the most 
impactful mission degraders on the F-35C aircraft and the maintenance processes involved 
with resolving those mission degraders. After analyzing the maintenance processes, we 
will aim to streamline and add value to them with an overall focus on improving aircraft 
availability.  
Some of the suspected causes of low readiness levels experienced by the F-35C 
operating out of Naval Air Station Lemoore are: low component reliability rates on mission 
systems, inefficient maintenance processes to resolve the mission degraders, lengthy wait 
times due to the cure time of hazardous materials involved with repairing low observability, 
and a low degree of parts available when requested. 
We will explore areas of research that encompass: the material availability of parts 
involved with resolving the mission degrader when required, an analysis on the reliability 
of the components involved with the mission degraders, an analysis of the bottlenecks such 
as manpower, materials, etc., involved with resolving the mission degraders, as well as an 
analysis on the available capacity at the squadron to rectify the aforementioned mission 
degraders. 
Both members of this project are aerospace maintenance duty officers in the U.S. 
Navy with a combined 18 years of naval aviation maintenance experience. Both have 
extensive experience in supporting tactical aircraft at both the organizational and 
intermediate level in both an expeditionary environment as well as afloat operations from 
an aircraft carrier. Both researchers have received Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act certification in production, quality, and manufacturing as well as 
program management. Our billets ranged from material control officers who were 
responsible for managing a squadron’s operating target budget to assistant maintenance 
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officers who were responsible for managing the manpower requirements of organizational 
units and maintenance training efforts of those organizations. Additionally, both served as 
Maintenance Material Control Officers who are directly responsible for the maintenance 
planning of execution for all assigned aircraft to a squadron as well as ensuring the 
accuracy of all documentation related to the maintenance performed on assigned aircraft. 
Our analysis of this research topic will be augmented by the professional aviation 
maintenance experience of both authors. 
C. RELEVANCE TO READINESS TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE 
This project revolves around a specific type of aircraft operating from a specific 
location. In this instance, it is the F-35C operating out of NAS Lemoore, California. NAS 
Lemoore was established in 1961 to support the U.S. Navy’s, Pacific Fleet. NAS Lemoore 
has also been labeled the West Coast Master Jet Base for the U.S. Navy where it provides 
the infrastructure, support, and services that enable both Commander, Strike Fighter Wing 
Pacific and Commander, Joint Strike Fighter Wing to conduct operations in support of 
national tasking (CNIC, n.d.). Tenant commands operating out of NAS Lemoore primarily 
include the F/A-18 E/F variants as well as the F-35C variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. 
Currently, F/A-18 E/F aircraft make up the vast majority of aircraft located on the air 
station, but that makeup will slowly shift over the coming years as squadrons transition 
from both the E and F variants of the F/A-18 to the F-35C. 
The intent behind our research is not only to improve readiness of the F-35C today 
in NAS Lemoore but also to provide an intuitive framework for maintenance managers to 
utilize within a Navy organizational maintenance department. Even though the platform 
will invariably evolve over its life cycle, our framework can readily be modified to 
accommodate for the changes that will occur to aid in the sustained readiness efforts. Naval 
aviation maintenance practices and processes tend to vary significantly from organization 
to organization. We intend to effectively communicate a standardized approach to how we 
perform maintenance with empirical data supporting how the standardized approach will 
ultimately result in higher rates of readiness. 
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The project seeks to improve aircraft availability by reducing maintenance 
downtime. Some maintenance practices could be optimized, which would reduce the total 
time the aircraft is down for maintenance. The project could improve the availability of 
mission-capable aircraft, which would improve the F-35C program implementation, aiding 
in the effectiveness of our assets, and saving precious naval aviation resources. 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Before commencing this project, the authors knew that our research was limited by 
the volume of data available due to the relatively brief time the F-35C has been operating 
in the capacity of an operational squadron vice a fleet replacement squadron or test and 
evaluation squadron. Despite this limitation, we felt it was still valuable to research the 
readiness issues VFA-147 experienced because it is the first representation of the 
challenges an operational F-35C squadron will experience and how they will perform with 
those challenges in mind. A significant additional limitation to this research is the relatively 
low level of knowledge the Department of Defense has in terms of data collection from the 
Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) and how to best leverage that information 
to their advantage. Additionally, the Navy has limited experience with operating the F-35C 
in an afloat operating environment. Lack of data in an operating sea environment is 
noteworthy because of the highly dynamic working environment that significantly affects 
maintenance cycle times due to the many constraints that aircraft carriers pose. Readers of 
this report will be served by keeping these limitations in mind. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
For this analysis the authors gathered data of maintenance actions from squadrons. 
The authors then took the data and organize it based on the total maintenance man-hours it 
takes to complete the action. The authors then used a Pareto Analysis to determine which 
maintenance actions are critical as they account for most of the maintenance time. The top 
degraders were analyzed using Lean process techniques to optimize maintenance down 
time and improve aircraft readiness. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Following this introduction, Chapter II is a comprehensive listing of the literature 
reviewed from the Department of Defense, academia, and related industry the authors 
chose to build the foundation for this analysis. Chapter III outlines the methodology and 
analytical tools the authors used in this research. Chapter IV presents the data, analysis, 
and key findings from the analysis. Chapter V encompasses the conclusions, 
recommendations for improvement, and recommended areas of future research to further 
the understanding of this subject. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, the authors discuss relevant literature on aviation maintenance, the 
importance of the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft, aircraft spares pooling 
programs, Lean process techniques, and aviation readiness through repair cycle time. 
A. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AND LEAN LITERATURE 
One of the two key research areas of this project focus on the top maintenance 
degrader that is classified as preventive. The concepts explored by James Jones define 
preventive maintenance in the following manner. 
Preventive maintenance actions are to preserve operability of the system or 
to address a fault before it progresses to a failure. Preventive maintenance 
often consists of inspections, condition monitoring, and scheduled removal 
of selected items subject to wear out or time-dependent degradation. The 
requirement to perform a preventive maintenance task is determined 
through a process called reliability centered maintenance (RCM). This 
process looks for ways of determining a failure is about to occur so that the 
preventive maintenance action is triggered to be performed. The frequency 
of performing a preventive maintenance action is determined on the 
criticality of the failure the action is intended to prevent. Typically, 
preventive maintenance actions are performed based on calendar days (such 
as daily, weekly, or monthly) or on usage events, such as after a 
predetermined number of aircraft landings, miles driven, or hours of 
operation. Preventive maintenance actions vary based on the technology of 
the system. Maintainability engineering uses the RCM methodology to 
determine specific preventive maintenance actions for a system and then 
determines the frequency of performance. After a preventive maintenance 
action is identified, it is analyzed to estimate the amount of time required 
for its performance. Mean preventive maintenance time (MPT) is then 
calculated using the frequency of performance as a weighting factor just as 
the failure rate was used as a weighting factor for corrective maintenance. 
(Jones, 2006, p. 67) 
The authors will rely on process improvement techniques like the process flow 
chart to help determine bottlenecks that impact throughput. The process flow chart as stated 
by the American Society for Quality (ASQ) “is a generic tool that can be adapted for a 
wide variety of purposes, and can be used to describe various processes, such as a 
manufacturing process, an administrative or service process, or a project plan” (ASQ, n.d.). 
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The author, Jonathan Law, discusses the use of Pareto Analysis and how it is a great 
tool to determine potential issues in any system.  
Developed by Vilfredo Pareto, the eighty-twenty rule can be used to 
concentrate management control and identify problem areas. Examples of 
the eighty-twenty rule in practice might include 20% of the workforce 
accounting for 80% of the salary bill; 80% of a company’s profits coming 
from 20% of its products; 80% of the stock value being tied up in 20% of 
the inventory. (Law, 2011) 
The eighty-twenty rule helps maintenance managers know where process issues lay and 
can provide an area to focus improvement efforts.  
Understanding the root cause of readiness degraders the author’s identified is the 
primary focus behind our research. The authors chose to use this method of analysis 
because of its ability to visually describe the potential causes associated with a problem 
(Phillips, 2013). Although the article “Using fishbone analysis to investigate problems” 
pertains to the application of the fishbone analysis within the context of health care 
services, the authors recognized the relevance this diagnostic tool had in understanding the 
symptoms of F-35C readiness. As Joanna Phillips (2013) noted, “Root cause analysis is 
increasingly being used in health and social service to improve safety and quality and 
minimize adverse events as it provides retrospective reviews of incidents or events.” In the 
same manner that health care requires a level of safety and quality be built into their 
processes to prevent adverse outcomes, aviation relies upon the same core principles in 
order to ensure the safety of not only the aircrew but also the maintenance technicians 
performing maintenance on the aircraft. 
Using the Ishikawa diagram or “fishbone diagram” will trigger ideas to help 
identify likely causes of problems (Conner, 2007, p. 283). The final objective of our 
research will be to determine what causes the various challenges involved with the 
necessary maintenance processes. 
With the intent of this research being focused on improving readiness, the authors 
needed to understand how the Department of Defense (DoD) defines readiness. 
Aviation readiness is measured by computing fully mission-capable (FMC) 
rates. The FMC rate indicates the operational availability of the aircraft in a 
9 
unit—that is, the fraction of aircraft that are mission capable at any arbitrary 
time. When aircraft are partially mission capable or not mission capable, it 
is because of either maintenance or supply problems. (Apte & Kang, 2006) 
The Navy has structured their maintenance activities into three different types of 
maintenance to facilitate aviation readiness. 
O-level maintenance is performed at the site and typically involves simple 
repairs or the replacement of modular components. I-level maintenance 
involves more difficult repairs and maintenance, including the repair and 
testing of modules that have failed at the O-level. I-level maintenance for 
Navy aircraft is done at Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments 
(AIMDs) ashore in naval air stations, or afloat in aircraft carriers. (Apte & 
Kang, 2006, p. 3) 
The third level of maintenance utilized by naval aviation is D-level maintenance. 
Depot level maintenance is performed at Fleet Readiness Centers to “ensure the continued 
flight integrity and safety of airframes and related flight systems throughout their service 
lives. This involves performing maintenance beyond the capabilities of the lower levels, 
usually on equipment requiring major overhaul or rebuilding of end-items, subassemblies, 
and parts” (Apte & Kang, 2006, p. 3). The Navy operates a total of eight Fleet Readiness 
Centers that provide either I or D-level maintenance or in some instances both levels of 
maintenance to support O-level maintenance efforts supporting readiness goals. 
“Every aspect of naval aviation is governed by the Naval Aviation Maintenance 
Program (NAMP). The NAMP is directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, but it is 
managed by the Commander, Naval Air Forces and it governs policies, procedures, and 
responsibilities for every level of aviation maintenance” (Doyle & Horowitz, 2018, p. 18). 
The NAMP is founded on the following four core principles, all of which are relevant to 
this research:  
Strict adherence to quality and safety procedures. 
Repair of aeronautical equipment and material at the level of maintenance 
that most efficiently uses resources in achieving operational objectives. 
Application of systematic planned maintenance to minimize material 
degradation of aircraft, engines, and equipment. 
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Collection and analysis of data to support changes to improve the efficiency, 
effectiveness, quality, and safety of naval aviation maintenance. (United 
States Navy, 2017) 
The authors wanted to ensure their research aligned with these four principles in 
order to ensure feasible recommendations could be developed based off the NAMP 
requirements placed on naval aviation. 
Maintenance procedures for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are published in the Joint-
Service Technical Data (JTD) section of Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS). 
The JTD allows a maintenance technician to access the proper repair procedures for each 
maintenance degrader. The JTD modules are comprised of maintenance actions that are 
published by Lockheed Martin and allow modification for up to date information for the 
correction of issues. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014). The JTD is a step-by-step 
process for maintenance technicians that includes the required material for a technician to 
complete the maintenance task to specification. The maintenance steps include the required 
maintenance conditions prior to a technician starting the maintenance and includes the 
tools, support equipment, and configuration the aircraft needs to be in. Once maintenance 
has begun the technician can follow the JTD to the completion of the maintenance that is 
being performed. Maintenance tasks will be listed in the order of manufacture requirements 
to include finishing the maintenance with the required follow-on maintenance steps.   
B. PRACTICE-RELATED LITERATURE 
Gertler (2010) discusses the background and requirements of the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter program. The article discussed the requirements for the Navy’s version of aircraft 
and its intended mission. “The Navy plans in the future to operate carrier air wings 
featuring a combination of F/A-18E/Fs (which the Navy has been procuring since FY1997) 
and F-35Cs” (Gertler, 2010, p. 4). The F-35C will be a part of the future of Naval Aviation 
and will enable fifth-generation capabilities in the air domain. 
The research in the study conducted by LCDR Mooney shows the importance of 
aviation maintenance concerning the turn-around time associated with available parts on 
hand to repair the issue (Mooney, 1997, p. 1). Cycle time is a critical component of part 
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inventory and has an impact on aircraft readiness. The ability to repair aircraft efficiently 
will allow the aircraft to operate, which directly relates to readiness. 
Single Minute Exchange of Dies (SMED) is relevant to the lean principles used in 
optimizing our maintenance techniques. SMED, according to Lean Enterprises by William 
A. Levinson and Raymond A. Rerick, details the importance of prepositioning tools and 
equipment to optimize set up time. “The idea is to perform as much setup work as possible 
while the machine is working on another job. This is external setup, or setup that is done 
outside the machine. Internal setup requires the machine to shut down” (Levinson & 
Rerick, 2002, p. 74). External setup techniques can be utilized as aircraft are about to shut 
down before the maintenance that is to be performed. Internal setup techniques should be 
used as the aircraft is waiting for the maintenance to be performed. 
The author discusses the importance of the Formula 1 (F1) pit stop strategy, and 
what makes the pit stop so important. 
Each team has a crew of nearly twenty people, working hard with 
completely fast, precise and coordinated moves from to fixing and repairing 
all the mechanical issues to just changing the tires. The pit stop time is the 
key to success in the race and teams know it better as every year they spend 
hours of training to achieve as fast as possible pit stops during races. 
(Stavropoulos, 2018, para. 23) 
Lessons from the F1 pit stop can translate into process efficiencies for aircraft tire changes 
and other types of maintenance. F1 pit crews are similar to aviation maintenance crews in 
that they are working to achieve a repair efficiently. By taking knowledge developed by 
F1 like the ability to have a maintenance person per action could improve aviation 
maintenance if appropriately emulated. 
C. SUMMARY 
Throughout the authors review of the aforementioned literature, the authors 
discovered no literature to date that focused on applying process improvement techniques 
to F-35C aircraft maintenance operations. Due to their professional experience in aviation 
maintenance and their education at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), they saw an 
opportunity to apply the analytical and process improvement tools they acquired at NPS to 
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develop literature that could be used to potentially both reduce maintenance downtime, 




Our approach to minimize maintenance downtime will start with understanding the 
issues that created the most downtime incurred from performing maintenance. The focus 
will be on the top maintenance issues that take the most time for maintenance crews to 
repair. The top issues or degraders will be found by receiving maintenance action forms 
with time-stamped data, showing the accumulated maintenance time for each task. Our 
approach that encompasses maintenance downtime could allow for the identification of 
maintenance tasks that could be optimized. Lean Six Sigma techniques accompanied by 
process flow optimization will allow us to identify which of the processes are to benefit 
from our analysis. 
Maintenance administration personnel at Strike Fighter Squadron 147 (VFA-147) 
will run each ad hoc query in the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) for the 
maintenance action forms to receive the data showing how much time had elapsed per work 
order. Our commencing data point will align with VFA-147’s receipt of their first three 
aircraft in October 2018, and our final data point will be August 2019. Once the data is 
received, we will categorize the maintenance data by the time elapsed per work order and 
the type of maintenance involved (e.g., preventive maintenance and corrective 
maintenance). After the elapsed maintenance time is shown, the maintenance actions that 
require the most time will be available. Maintenance information will be recorded by ALIS 
for each work order, or maintenance action, keeping a time-log of processes.  
In order to find where we would be able to minimize maintenance downtime, we 
would need to understand the steps in each maintenance process. Each process requires 
different maintenance actions to complete the work order. Maintenance administration 
personnel will reference the individual steps in the Joint-Service Technical Data (JTD) 
database, which will allow us to map the current processes for the top maintenance 
degraders. Using Lean, Six-Sigma, and process-flow analysis, we will be able to locate 
bottlenecks in maintenance processes and reduce maintenance downtime. 
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Our primary focus throughout this research will revolve around measuring the 
actual elapsed maintenance time that incurred as a result of having to resolve a mission 
degrader and assessing how well the maintenance activity is performing relative to the 
expected maintenance time that the procedures outline. Our analysis will encompass 
several areas (e.g., Pareto analysis to determine the top maintenance degraders, 
maintenance process cycle times, bottleneck analysis within the process, the frequency at 
which the degraders occur with the associated maintenance man-hours required to resolve 
maintenance action).  
With our objective to increase aircraft availability in mind and our experience in 
aviation maintenance operations, we will focus on measuring and analyzing the 
maintenance turnaround time (TAT) involved with resolving these mission degraders. Our 
intent with using TAT is a two-part decision. First, from our experience with aviation 
maintenance, we have a firm understanding of how TAT and aircraft availability are linked, 
and secondly, we understand the learning curve that is associated with learning the 
maintenance procedures on a new platform. The TAT will be measured in terms of elapsed 
maintenance time (EMT) and total maintenance man-hours (TMMH) to achieve the 
maintenance actions. 
It is for these reasons we realize the potential for improvements in maintenance 
operations at this phase of the platform’s implementation into the USN inventory. As 
students of Naval Postgraduate School, we are in a unique position to understand the 
problem with the ability to look at the problem from an outside perspective. Our position 
allows us to take an objective approach to reduce the TAT involved with maintenance 
operations, and as a result, we should be able to facilitate an increase in aircraft availability. 
A. NEW INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Maintenance-related degraders encompass maintenance management practices and 
procedures that are commonly found in naval aviation. However, the platform introduces 
a new information technology management database, Autonomic Logistics Information 
System (ALIS), as well as the aircraft’s low observable surface, which brings additional 
challenges since the USN has minimal experience with these items. ALIS allows Navy F-
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35C squadrons the ability to network several different systems encompassing several 
stakeholders involved in the sustainment – a first for the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE). 
This new information system can increase transparency across the entire logistics system, 
but it comes with several new challenges and processes that the Navy is learning on the fly 
(no pun intended). For our area of interest in process analysis, ALIS is the primary means 
for tracking the status of required maintenance actions as well as compiling the total 
elapsed maintenance time for the repair process. ALIS is a new information system by 
Lockheed Martin that is improving in increments, and it brings new challenges from a 
maintenance management perspective. Expressly, ALIS’s inability to determine when 
parts will fail has not provided for the fidelity maintenance manager’s need to avoid flying 
components until failure. This shortfall has impaired maintenance manager’s ability to 
effectively develop and execute scheduled maintenance, which has potentially contributed 
to the low levels of reliability experienced by Lemoore based squadrons. 
B. FIRST-EVER LOW OBSERVABLE NAVAL AIRCRAFT 
In addition to the challenges a new information management system brings, the F-
35C platform also brings the added challenge of maintaining its low observable surfaces—
a skillset in which the Navy previously had little to no experience. Most maintenance on 
previous naval aircraft was easily accessible by their inherent design of fasteners and 
latches to secure panels of the aircraft to the airframe of the aircraft. What makes the F-
35C unique to previous naval aircraft platforms is that numerous maintenance actions 
performed by organizational activities require breaking the integrity of the low observable 
surface of the aircraft. Low observable surface maintenance could add a step or many steps 
to organizational maintenance activities processes that did not previously exist. 
In addition to the challenges faced during the removal and replacement of low 
observable types of panels, it is still unknown how durable the low observable surfaces will 
be when operating at sea for extended periods. Currently, the F-35C does not have the 
scheduled maintenance intervals to inspect for corrosion that requires removing these 
panels as has been the standard with previous naval aircraft. Our analysis may provide an 
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estimate on how readiness would be affected if the Navy were to apply its preventive 
maintenance procedures to areas our research will cover with the F-35C. 
C. PARETO ANALYSIS 
We will use a Pareto ABC analysis to determine the top degraders that consume the 
most maintenance time per maintenance action. The maintenance times will be calculated 
from the work start to the completion of the maintenance action. We will receive the 
information from the maintenance information system, ALIS. We will categorize 
maintenance time by the type of repair that occurred on the corresponding system. The 
accumulated time-stamped maintenance data will allow us to rank the maintenance actions 
that consumed the most time. 
Once the maintenance actions with the highest accumulated maintenance time are 
apparent, we will then use the Pareto analysis to determine which maintenance actions 
would be the best to optimize. The Pareto analysis will categorize the maintenance actions 
into which maintenance action would make the most improvement in the overall system if 
fixed. The Pareto analysis breaks the critical problems into the vital few and the useful 
many. The vital few are listed as 80% of the maintenance downtime, which would be 
improved if we fixed one problem. For the project scope, we will focus on the vital few 
category items, to achieve the highest level of maintenance optimization available with the 
project time available. (Law, 2011)   
D. FISHBONE ANALYSIS 
Determining what the main challenges of the maintenance processes are is essential 
but understanding the cause and effect relationships is crucial in developing a way forward 
to improve the efficiency involved with these processes. Using the Ishikawa diagram or 
“fishbone diagram” will trigger ideas to help identify likely causes of problems (Conner, 
2007, p. 283). The final objective of our research will be to determine what causes the 
various challenges involved with the necessary maintenance processes. Specific areas are 
taken into consideration, like: What was the causal factor of the bottleneck in each process 
and what could be done within the organization to improve efficiency without any external 
adjustments? For all external causal factors, we will provide a recommendation as to what 
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could reduce some of the inefficiencies about the maintenance processes ranging from 
material availability to manpower recommendations.  
E. LIMITATIONS 
Before entering our research on this topic, we understood there were several 
challenges from a maintainability data perspective that would limit our scope. The most 
apparent limitation we faced was the short period the F-35C has been in service and the 
number of F-35C aircraft the Navy has maintained at the operational level. As a result, the 
amount of existing maintenance data will not be nearly as robust as what one would expect 
from an analysis of F/A-18 maintenance processes. Additionally, the maintenance data 
only reflects the total maintenance man hours (TMMH) and does not capture the cure times 
associate with low observable (LO) restoration and repair if required. This lack of 
information does skew the actual downtime associated with any maintenance action 
requiring LO work as a result. Due to the time available for this project, we will narrow 
our scope to the vital few top degraders requiring maintenance.  
We also understand that a squadron will often have other types of maintenance 
(e.g., pre and post-flight aircraft inspections and servicing) occurring at the same time as 
the significant maintenance issues we are analyzing. In some instances, ongoing squadron 
operations may cause a competition of resources in the form of tools, human resources, 
and technician skillsets. Additionally, due to the vast quantity of specialized tools and 
support equipment required to perform maintenance on the F-35C, we will make the 
assumption the squadron would have immediate access to them since the squadron is 
designed and funded with expedience in mind.  
Several maintenance functions are required to perform maintenance on the F-35C 
that may not be captured and documented in ALIS. Specific examples include but are not 
limited to: the time accrued completing pre-operational inspections and tool inventories, 
the travel time required for pre-positioning required support equipment to facilitate 
maintenance, and the time required to research maintenance procedures before completing 
a maintenance task. It is important to keep this aspect in mind in analyzing capacity because 
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it cannot be aggregated in a manner that truly captures the capacity utilization of an aviation 
maintenance activity. 
Another limitation of our analysis entails the limitations in harvesting material 
supply information beyond the time ordered to the time accrued, once the item is received. 
We are only able to assess the optimal inventory levels for materials required to resolve 
these discrepancies. Lockheed Martin manages a global supply pool of all F-35 variants 
for all partner nations. We do not have access to Lockheed Martin’s current inventory 
levels nor the service levels they are required to provide to the services and partner nations. 
Additionally, Lockheed Martin determines the priorities throughout the global supply 
system for all variants of the F-35, unlike what the DoD has historically done. 
We also understand that a squadron’s available manpower is continually 
fluctuating. With this in mind, we will use the actual amount of manpower available at 
VFA-147 as of July 12, 2019. VFA-147’s available manpower and maintenance capacity 
at this time should reflect an accurate depiction of what the squadron would have available 
during a deployment period. Actual numbers may vary as time progresses, and the Navy 
transitions more squadrons to the F-35C platform. Our final significant limitation for this 
research will be the lack of data available for maintenance operations while at sea. This 
limitation is again a result of the limited time the USN has owned and operated the F-35C 
in an afloat environment where the constraints and limitations are much different than they 
are ashore. Due to this lack of information, our research limits will be an analysis of ashore 
maintenance operations only. 
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IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, an analysis of the following will be discussed: aircraft operational 
availability (Ao), a brief background of the new information system, challenges associated 
with low observable aircraft, a Pareto Analysis to determine the most impactful 
maintenance degraders that were on the F-35C, an analysis of potential causal factors of 
these maintenance degraders depicted in a fishbone analysis, and a process flow analysis 
of the top degrader for both corrective and preventive maintenance actions which are 
depicted in process flow charts. The types of analysis listed above will be used to reduce 
maintenance downtime and improve aircraft readiness. 
The data was broken down into two sections on which to focus our analysis. The 
overall maintenance degraders were broken down into categories of preventive 
maintenance and corrective maintenance. From those two categories, the authors used 
Pareto Analysis to determine the top degraders for each. The author’s analysis will break 
down the process flows with associated times for Post Operations Servicing, and Tire and 
Wheel maintenance with the intent to reduce maintenance downtime. 
Our analysis was explicitly focused on the total maintenance man-hours (TMMH) 
associated with each degrader and the impact they have on the operational availability (Ao) 
of the F-35C aircraft operating at NAS Lemoore, California. The author’s intent of this 
analysis was to synthesize the data in a manner that identifies what specific maintenance 
actions are impacting readiness the most based on the frequency they occur and the down 
maintenance downtime associated with the assessed degraders. Of note, the authors 
observed numerous types of maintenance related degraders that are not depicted in this 
chapter due to the relatively low impact they caused on Ao both in terms of downtime and 
frequency of occurrence. 
B. AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY (AO) 
As mentioned in the overview, the authors feel it is essential to mention the effect 
of improving a maintenance process on the operational availability (Ao) of aircraft. 
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Operational availability reflects the percent of time mission-capable aircraft are available 
out of the total number of aircraft available in a squadron. To further explain our point, the 
authors added a hypothetical Ao problem. Our problem is based on an F-35C squadron that 
models the flight hours from a typical day at a strike fighter squadron. An aircraft can fly 
as many as four flights a day, which would total around four hours per aircraft.  
An F-35C aircraft squadron is comprised of 10 aircraft. Each aircraft operates on 
average, four hours a day due to administrative requirements at the squadron such as 
checking tools, pre-operational inspections of support equipment and technical research. 
Two F-35C aircraft currently require a tire change (corrective maintenance action) once a 
day, and each tire change averages one hour to complete. The F-35C also requires a post-
operation service (preventive maintenance action) upon recovery and shutdown at the end 
of the flight schedule. The post-operation servicing lasts, on average, one hour.  
 
Operating time / year = 10 aircraft x 4 hours / day x 365 days = 14600 hours /year 
Hours of CM down time / year = 2 aircraft x 2 hour x 365 days = 1460 hours /year 
Hours of PM down time / year = 10 aircraft x 1 hour x 365 days = 3650 hours/year 
Ao = (14600 – 1460 – 3650) / 14600 = 0.65  
Now, if a maintenance process was optimized or reduced by 15 minutes per 
maintenance action, the Ao would improve as depicted below: 
Hours of CM down time / year = 2 aircraft x 1.75 hours x 365 days = 1277.5 hrs/yr 
Hours of PM down time / year = 10 aircraft x 0.75 hour x 365 days = 2737.5 hrs/yr 
Ao = (14600 – 1277.5 - 2737.5) / 14600 = 0.725 
In this hypothetical example, process improvement techniques improve the overall 
availability of mission capable aircraft by 7.5 percentage points. The problem above shows 
how important a small process improvement can make a large difference over time. A 2% 
reduction in maintenance time can improve the overall readiness of the squadron by 7.5 
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percentage points (E. Dahel, class notes, July 10, 2019). Therefore, the steps taken to 
reduce maintenance time is a good investment. 
C. MAINTENANCE-RELATED READINESS DEGRADERS (PARETO 
ANALYSIS) 
All maintenance actions from October 2018 to July 2019 were sorted by the type 
of degrader impacting aircraft assigned to the squadron and entered in a Pareto analysis. 
Each maintenance degrader was then averaged for the total amount of time incurred over 
all the recorded occurrences of that degrader. The average was then multiplied by the 
number of defects or times the maintenance degrader occurred, giving the total 
maintenance time based on frequency times average time per frequency. The discrepancies 
were then ranked in order from the most amount of maintenance man-hours to the least. 
1. Analysis of Maintenance-Related Degraders from October 1, 2018, to 
August 22, 2019 
Our Pareto analysis consists of the most common and impactful maintenance 
actions recorded from October 2018 through July 2019. The squadron’s maintenance effort 
for the F-35C is listed in Tables 1 and 2, which depicts the rank and order of maintenance 
man-hours consumed. As shown in Figure 1, the most impactful maintenance action 
observed were aircraft modifications made to the aircraft, which accounted for 25.9% of 
the maintenance man-hours during this period. The second most impactful maintenance 
action identified as the Post Operations Servicing (POS) inspection, consuming the second 
most amount of maintenance man-hours. The POS alone accounted for 18.4% of the 
maintenance man-hours for VFA-147 and was the highest preventive maintenance action 
observed. The maintenance procedure that follows the POS was aircraft washes, which 
totaled 14.8% of the maintenance effort, followed by a wide variety of maintenance actions 
in the area of the aircraft where the Integrated Power Package (IPP) is located.
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Figure 1. The Overall Maintenance-Related Degraders Identified at VFA-147 
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Table 1. Maintenance Degrader Listing. Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
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The authors analyzed the 51,396 line items of maintenance data and from that 
analysis, determined what maintenance degraders had the most impact on readiness based 
off required maintenance time and frequency of occurrence. The maintenance degraders 
were then consolidated into a detailed listing as depicted in Table 1 in order of highest to 
lowest impact on readiness. Subsequently, the maintenance degraders into two categories: 
corrective maintenance (CM) and preventive maintenance (PM). Corrective maintenance 
is defined as the maintenance that occurs due to a defect or fault discovered in a system on 
the aircraft. The maintenance crews will receive a malfunction code in the cockpit of the 
aircraft that will be transmitted to ALIS and in the form of a Health Reporting Codes 
(HRC). The HRC labels the specific fault discovered and ties that fault with maintenance 
procedures required to resolve the degrader. Our second category of maintenance was 
preventive maintenance. 
Preventive maintenance actions are to preserve the operability of the system 
or to address a fault before it progresses to a failure. Preventive maintenance 
often consists of inspections, condition monitoring, and scheduled removal 
of selected items subject to wear or time-dependent degradation. Typically, 
preventive maintenance actions are performed based on calendars (such as 
daily, weekly, or monthly) or usage events, such as predetermined number 
of aircraft landings, miles driven, or hours of operation. After a preventive 
maintenance action is identified, it is analyzed to estimate the amount of 
time required for its performance. (Jones, 2006, p. 67)  
A detailed breakdown of the analyzed maintenance degrader’s frequency of 
occurrence and the associated maintenance time per occurrence is depicted in Table 2. Of 
note, our analysis intentionally omitted aircraft modifications and the IPP for several 
reasons. One common reason for this omission was the high variability involved with 
maintenance involving the IPP and the maintenance involved with aircraft modifications. 
Specifically, the IPP maintenance that has been completed to date has been done so for 
several reasons. Some examples include a removal of the IPP in order to facilitate other 
maintenance, entering the IPP area to access other systems, entering the IPP area to conduct 
a visual inspection for leaks or damage, and maintenance required to remove and replace 
either a failed IPP or an IPP that has reached a forced removal interval. Similar to the issues 
with analyzing IPP-related maintenance, the high variability of aircraft modifications 
26 
prevented us from conducting a meaningful analysis. This data should be captured and 
tracked in the future to further the understanding of why this area of the aircraft is requiring 
the attention of maintenance technicians. IPP maintenance was due to a high variation of 
the types of modifications being performed to the aircraft, the high variation in aircraft 
configurations, and the variation of modifications that were incorporated at different levels 
of maintenance (e.g., both organizational and depot level modifications). Despite our 
inability to analyze these modifications, we deemed it necessary to highlight the impact the 
incorporation of these modifications has on the operational availability of the aircraft 
assigned to the squadron.  
2. Corrective Maintenance 
The Pareto analysis in Figure 2 reflects all corrective maintenance actions that were 
assessed. It is measured in terms of total maintenance man-hours that were required to 
resolve and the frequency associated with a specific type of maintenance action taken by 
the squadron to resolve the maintenance degrader. Additionally, the analysis is broken 
down into two essential categories: “vital few” and the “useful many.” The highlighted 
vital few reflect the types of maintenance actions that, when combined, consume 80% of 
the squadron’s total maintenance man-hours. The intent behind this type of analysis is to 
illuminate where a manager should focus their efforts first in order to improve the overall 
output of an organization efficiently (Law, 2011).
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Figure 2. Pareto Analysis of Corrective Maintenance Degraders 
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Table 3. Detailed Corrective Maintenance Breakdown. Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
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3. Tire and Wheel Maintenance 
Tire and wheel maintenance is a routine maintenance action that is required to 
support flight operations. Specifically, tire and wheel maintenance for this analysis will be 
focused on the corrective nature of tire and wheel maintenance, which involves removing 
and replacing tires on both the nose landing gear (NLG) and main landing gear (MLG). 
The replacement is a result of tire depth being out of the established criteria in the JTD. 
The amount of tire wear varies based on the environment it is operating in (e.g., afloat 
operations historically induce significantly more wear on tires due to the extreme 
conditions they experience during an arrested landing on an aircraft carrier). Due to 
minimal afloat operating time, almost all our data is of tire and wheel maintenance 
performed ashore and the tire wear associated with ashore operations. 
The data has been filtered to remove all maintenance occurrences that were pressure 
checks to capture the actual downtime of a tire change. The data reflect the number of 
defects multiplied by the average time per tire change for a total of 433.216 maintenance 
man-hours. The Pareto analysis shows that tire maintenance accounts for 31.5% of 
corrective maintenance actions for the period of October 2018 to July 2019. The data was 
broken down into maintenance steps needed to achieve removal and replacement of the 
tire. The maintenance steps are calculated to find the average time over the maintenance 
work orders. In this case, the main landing gear tire change consists of three steps. Step 
one averages 37.47 minutes to complete, step two lasts 12.21 minutes, step three takes 
50.33 minutes. The three steps are noted in the maintenance data as critical steps to remove 
and replace the main landing gear tire/wheel assembly.  
Tire and wheel maintenance is the top degrader for the corrective maintenance 
category. Figure 2 shows the different maintenance process that make up the vital few. The 
vital few maintenance processes shown in dark color are 80% of the squadron’s 
maintenance effort within 20% of the maintenance processes. Tire and wheel maintenance 
is the only process that extends above the 80% cut-off which requires process 
improvements to help reduce the maintenance efforts of the unit. 
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The nose landing gear tire replacement consists of two steps listed in Table 4 to 
complete the maintenance action. Step one takes 27.57 minutes on average, while step two 
takes 24.91 minutes on average.  
Table 4. Average TMMH of Each MLG Tire and Wheel Core Step. 
Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
 
 
When we compare the maintenance steps listed in Table 5 to the process times, we 
may find inefficiencies that could benefit from lean principals. Maintenance step time is 
used to determine the utilization of maintenance shop capacity.  
Table 5. Average TMMH of Each NLG Tire and Wheel Core Step. 
Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
 
 
4. Preventive Maintenance 
The analysis on preventive maintenance as shown in Figure 3 lists the POS as the 
top degrader. Following the same analysis for preventive as the authors did with corrective 
maintenance, the vital few cut-off that consumes 80% of the squadron maintenance effort 
will be the focus for process improvement. 
The POS is a preventive maintenance inspection on a conditional basis that applies 
to the aircraft after an aircraft has completed a flight and is ceasing flight operations for 
that period. Once complete, the POS inspection is valid for a period of 72 hours after it is 
completed. The primary intent of the POS inspection is to identify cuts, fluid leaks, cracks, 
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corrosion, and other damage in order to ensure the aircraft is safe for flight operations 
within the same operating period. (JTD, n.d.)  
As shown in the Pareto analysis (Figure 3), the POS inspection consumes large 
quantities of maintenance man-hours. Throughout October 2018 to July 2019, the POS 
accounted for 1121 maintenance hours and 42.8%(Table 6) of the maintenance effort for 
preventive maintenance actions. Our results from the Pareto analysis show how much time 
the squadron is using to perform the POS inspection. The Pareto analysis allows us to focus 
on the steps that make up the POS, and the times associated with each.  
 
Figure 3. Pareto Analysis of Preventive Maintenance Degraders
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Table 6. Detailed Breakdown of Preventive Maintenance Degraders TMMH. Adapted from 
Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
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ALIS data shows that the POS is broken up into at most 11 steps for time. From 
start to finish, the POS inspection takes .5514 total maintenance man-hours (TMMH) on 
average to complete based on the total historical data based on the 4 different organizations 
analyzed. However, the most recent observation from VFA-147 maintenance step data 
actually total 7 steps for time and are represented in Table 7. The steps are separated, and 
the times associated with each step are averaged in Table 7. The total step data from VFA-
147 shows an average inspection time of 1.024 TMMH.  
Table 7. Average TMMH of Each POS Core Step. Adapted from 
Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
 
 
D. MANPOWER CAPACITY ANALYSIS 
The POS inspection requires at least one All Purpose General (APG) to complete 
the maintenance action. An APG can be a wide range of types of maintenance technicians 
who possess the most basic aviation maintenance skillsets that reside within an aviation 
squadron. The POS inspection is completed by maintenance technicians who reside in the 
Line Division of the maintenance department, expressly Work Center 310. A POS 
inspection is required for every aircraft before a flight and on average, consumes .5514 
total TMMH to complete. Each working shift of the Line Division currently contains 17 
workers who are available for nine hours each shift, five days a week while ashore. Each 
shift has a total maintenance capacity of 153 total maintenance man-hours available. The 
data supports only one maintenance technician to complete a POS inspection, which 
equates to every POS inspection consuming 0.36% of each shift’s maintenance capacity. 
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In conclusion, the authors determined manpower capacity is not a constraint in a 
squadron’s ability to complete a POS inspection. 
E. FISHBONE ANALYSIS 
In the 1950s, Japanese Professor Kaurou Ishikawa was the first person to 
describe the cause of a problem using a visual diagram, commonly known 
as the fishbone analysis diagram, named for its resemblance to a fish 
backbone and ribs. It has since become a key diagnostic tool for analyzing 
and illustrating problems within root cause analysis and is a useful 
diagnostic tool in service improvement projects. This process elicits root 
causes rather than just symptoms and results in a detailed visual diagram of 
all the possible causes of a particular problem. Exploring issues in detail 
often demonstrate possible solutions that might not have been previously 
considered. (Phillips, 2013, para. 2)  
The figures below reflect the fishbone analysis, the author has explored for both the 
highest-ranked corrective maintenance degrader and the highest-ranked preventive 
maintenance degrader.  
1. Tire and Wheel Maintenance 
The fishbone diagram below looks at root cause of issues regarding the frequency 
of tire and wheel replacement located on the right hand side of the chart. Each line that 
comes off the main issue is a sub element of the main cause such as “required maintenance 
time” which lists potential causes of the overall issue. To understand the cause of our tire 
and wheel maintenance downtime, we needed to look at the maintenance process through 
a fishbone analysis. The fishbone analysis allows the authors to ask specific questions 
regarding cause and effect. The authors broke the analysis into categories of manpower, 
tools, specialty tools or equipment, material, tires, and required maintenance time as 
depicted in Figure 4. The analysis allowed the authors to look into capacity issues that may 
arise from a lack of available maintainers or training deficiencies. The availability of 
hazardous materials required consumables, ready for issue spares, and material integrity 
were also questioned. The author’s goal is to find a reason processes take as long as they 




Figure 4. Tire and Wheel Fishbone Analysis Depicting Potential Process Causal Factors
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Key Takeaways 
Manpower. The VFA-147 shift list does not show and concerns for technician 
capacity or qualifications. 
Standard Tools. Data does not show any concerns tools. 
Specialty Tools and Support Equipment. There are known issues with the 
calibration of tire inflator kits, and inconsistencies of support equipment being pre-
positioned to lower cycle times. 
Material. There is no data to support issues with hazardous material or a lack of 
consumable material like nitrile gloves or grease. 
Tires. There is no data to support a lack of tire quality or ready-for-issue spares. 
Required Maintenance Time. Based on experience, the required maintenance times 
are consistent with similar Type/Model/Series.  
2. Post-operations Service (POS) 
The authors similarly compared POS fishbone analysis to the tire and wheel 
fishbone analysis. Components of the POS procedure were analyzed in Figure 5 to give a 
better understanding of the possible cause and effect of POS and maintenance downtime. 
Categories consist of manpower, standard tools, specialty tools and support equipment, 
material, and required maintenance time.  
Key Takeaways 
Manpower. The VFA-147 shift list does not show and concerns for technician 
capacity or qualifications. The requirement for maintenance technicians for this task 
includes an APG technician and an Aviation Electronics Technician (AT). 
Standard Tools. Data and feedback from the squadron do not indicate any concerns 
with regards to the availability of requisite tools or the condition of tools on hand. 
Specialty Tools and Support Equipment. There have been no reported or 
documented issues with any required specialty tools to date. 
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Material. There is no data to support issues with hazardous material or a lack of 
consumable material like nitrile gloves or grease. 
Required Maintenance Time. It is difficult to assess whether the current time 
observed is efficient or not efficient for a couple of crucial reasons. First, the OEM does 
not provide a baseline estimate for how long the POS inspection should require, on average. 
Secondly, previous type/model/series naval aircraft do not have an equivalent inspection 
that is as in-depth as what is required with this specific inspection. 
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Figure 5. POS Fishbone Analysis Depicting Potential Process Causal Factors
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F. PROCESS FLOW CHARTS 
The process flow charts show a linear progression of the focused maintenance tasks. 
Each task is listed in a rectangle with the title of the action taking place. Diamond shapes 
on the flow chart are points in the process that require a decision to take place. Each process 
core area will be represented with a time associated for that process to take place. The 
process flow chart data was collected from the JTD which lists the maintenance procedures 
per maintenance action. Maintenance processes were interpreted from the JTD and placed 
into a process flow by the authors. The process flow key shown in Figure 6 will show the 
meaning of different steps in the flow charts. 
 
Figure 6. Depiction of Process Flow Chart Key 
The process flow charts continue the authors’ analysis into the POS and tire 
maintenance. Tire maintenance is broken down further into two types based on the area of 
the aircraft the maintenance is being performed. The two different types of maintenance 
the process flows focus on is maintenance on the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) and Main 
Landing Gear (MLG). The process flow charts break down the separate maintenance 
processes by each required step, which will allow the authors to identify areas of potential 
improvement.  
1. Post-operations Servicing Initial Process Flow Chart 
The process flow depicted in Figures 7 through 9 below illustrates all of the 
required conditions of the aircraft before conducting the POS inspection, all maintenance 
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tasks required to be completed during the POS inspection, and all required follow-on 
maintenance required after the POS inspection is complete. The process below has been 
broken down by the squadron into core maintenance tasks that are depicted as steps. Those 
steps also illustrate the average time required for that core maintenance function and are 
depicted with blue arrows that delineate the beginning and end off a core maintenance task. 
Additionally, the process is illustrated by three distinct types of maintenance tasks: the 
visual inspection of the aircraft, the aircraft engine inspection, and the LO inspection 
(OML) of the aircraft’s surfaces. 
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Figure 7. Established JTD POS Maintenance Process Flow Chart Part I. Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
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Figure 8. Established JTD POS Maintenance Process Flow Chart Part II. Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
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Figure 9. Established JTD POS Maintenance Process Flow Chart Part III. Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.)..
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To reduce the maintenance process time, the squadron compressed 50 maintenance 
tasks into seven core areas that require a maintenance technician to sign off when complete. 
We have annotated these core areas throughout the process as steps, in the same manner, 
the core areas are depicted in the raw data. Due to the squadron’s ability to modify the 
administrative requirements for completing a maintenance action, we did observe a 
variation in how every organization has broken down the 50 maintenance tasks into core 
areas requiring an administrative signoff. In the specific instance of the POS inspection, 
we observed organizations breaking down the inspection into anywhere from six total core 
areas to as much as eleven core areas that a maintenance technician would sign off as they 
progressed through the completion of the maintenance action. 
Our analysis of the POS inspection highlighted a clear bottleneck in the process. 
However, it would be remiss not to note the second most time-intensive step required 
nearly as much time as the bottleneck. In this process, the bottleneck was identified as ‘Step 
3’ which was the OML portion of the POS inspection and required, on average, 16.91 
minutes to complete. The purpose of this portion is to assess if the surfaces of the aircraft 
received any damage throughout the operating period that day. This step has not only 
several maintenance tasks associated with it but also requires specialized skillsets if any 
damage is discovered on any low observable surfaces, which then requires a Low 
Observable Data Entry Module (LODEM) assessment. The next most time-consuming step 
of this inspection we identified was Step 4, which entails the basic maintenance tasks that 
ensure the aircraft did not incur any damage that would affect the safety of flight. On 
average, this portion of the process required 16.53 minutes, which is to be expected due to 
it containing the most significant amount of maintenance tasks, although they 
predominantly do not require specialty skillsets and are primarily visual inspections in 
nature.  
The POS inspection requires three different types of maintenance technicians: one 
APG, one Aviation Electronics Technician (AT), and one Aviation Structural Mechanic – 
Safety Equipment (AME).  
An APG can complete the following portions of the POS inspection: 
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Make aircraft safe for maintenance 
Step 2 ‘SCHED’ 
Step 3 ‘POS OML’ 
Step 4 ‘POS’ 
Step 6 ‘Torque Stripe Inspection’ 
Step 7 ‘Engine Inspection’ 
An AT can complete the following portions of the POS inspection: 
Step 5 ‘SCHED’ 
Although an AT must complete Step 5, they may also be capable of completing 
steps 2 through 7 if they have completed the requisite qualification. 
An AME must complete the following portions of the POS inspection: 
Step 1 ‘INSP’ 
Although an AME must complete Step 1, they may also be capable of completing 
steps 2 through 7 if they have completed the requisite qualification. 
During our analysis of the data about the POS inspection, we observed 1,160 
instances where a single step within the inspection was completed with only one minute of 
total elapsed maintenance time (EMT). This is noteworthy in that it may skew the data in 
a manner that does not fully represent the actual time required to complete the POS 
inspection. The squadron’s maintenance leadership observed that the POS inspection 
requires 60 minutes of EMT to complete, whereas our data reflects an average of 33.086 
minutes of TMMH. This disparity can partially be attributed to administrative signoffs in 
the form of a work order back fit. A work order is back fitted in instances where ALIS is 
offline, and the work was completed on a paper worker and subsequently entered into the 
ALIS database once the service is restored. These back fits are commonly reflected in the 
raw data as “Post Operations Servicing Back Fit” and reflect one TMMH of labor time. 
Although the data primarily reflects only one worker completing the inspection, we 
discovered after consultation with the squadron’s maintenance leadership that the squadron 
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typically had several maintenance technicians working on the POS in conjunction with one 
another. This application of manpower does not impact the analysis in terms of cycle time 
required to complete a POS inspection. However, it does skew the TMMH that the 
squadron is truly expending in order to complete the POS inspection in the time we 
observed.  
2. Proposed Parallel POS Inspection 
To improve the POS inspection process, the authors divided the inspection into core 
areas in a parallel process procedure. Instead of following a linear process with one 
maintainer before, the process requires a maintenance person per core requirement. Each 
core area listed in Figure 10 requires an individual maintainer to start the process at the 
same time as the rest of the inspection. The required conditions will be set at the recovery 
of the aircraft by the pilot in command and are all highlighted in yellow in Figure 10. 
Having the aircraft configured by the pilot before the aircraft is shut down, will eliminate 
the need for specific support equipment to be in position and connected to the aircraft at 
the start of the inspection.  
The core areas completed by separate personnel follow the principle of professional 
race teams and their pit crews. The more people they can concentrate on core areas, the 
faster the evolution is complete. Increasing the capacity by assigning maintainers to the 
specific tasks will reduce overall cycle time by making the task shorter for each person. An 
AME will inspect the cockpit and canopy which are listed as light brown processes in 
Figure 10. At the same time, the maintenance processes marked in dark green on top of the 
aircraft will be inspected by the plane captain, who also has to inspect the whole aircraft 
for final signoff approval. The front of the aircraft will be inspected by an AT who are 
required to clean the electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) windows on the aircraft. The 
AT will inspect the processes in blue. The lower left hand and right-hand inspections would 
be completed by two different general maintainers, as will the engine inspection. Each 
process to be accomplished by the general maintainer are colored as red, dark blue and 
light green respectively.  
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The maintenance team will start at the same spot in front of the aircraft, as depicted 
in Figures 11 and 12, at the same time. The maintainers will then move about their areas 
of responsibility, followed by the plane captain to complete the POS inspection. The outer 
mold line (OML) inspection will be accomplished by adding an additional qualified 




Figure 10. Proposed Parallel Process Improvement for POS 
Inspection. Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
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Figure 11. The Current Process Flow Is Depicting the Path and 
Location of Maintenance Tasks. Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
  
Figure 12. The Proposed Parallel Process Flow Is Depicting the Path 
and Location of Maintenance 
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3. Nose Landing Gear Process Flow Chart 
The process flow depicted in Figure 13 illustrates all the required conditions of the 
aircraft before removing and replacing a nose landing gear tire, all maintenance tasks 
required to be completed during that maintenance action, and all required follow-on 
maintenance required to be completed before the aircraft is operational again. The process 
below has been broken down by the squadron into three core maintenance tasks that are 
depicted as steps. Those steps illustrate the average time required for that core maintenance 
function and are depicted with blue arrows delineating the beginning and end off a core 
maintenance task. Additionally, the process is illustrated by three distinct types of 
maintenance tasks: the removal of the nose landing gear wheel and tire assembly and the 
installation of that assembly.
50 
 
Figure 13. Established JTD NLG Maintenance Process Flow Chart. Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.).
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The process flow chart depicts the nose landing gear removal and replacement 
maintenance action. The data is broken down into two steps, where step one is the removal 
of the tire assembly, and step two is the replacement of the tire assembly. The process flow 
chart in Figure 13 shows the maintenance processes that make up the removal step and the 
time associated, which is 27.57 minutes on average. The second step is the replacement or 
installation of the nose landing gear and depicted in the process flow chart with an average 
time of 24.91 minutes. Based on our analysis, the maintenance process takes 20 steps and 
places those steps into two core process steps. Maintenance data is recorded into ALIS with 
two core processes for administration purposes to reduce process times of signing off the 
work order.  
The analysis revealed a bottleneck during the removal process as it takes the longest 
time to complete. Due to the categorization of the maintenance times into two core 
processes, EMTs do not represent process sub-steps that make up the two core process 
steps. Also, the EMT associated with the required conditions listed as “make aircraft safe 
for maintenance” do not exist, which will skew the actual time required to complete the 
maintenance action. Support equipment available such as the dolly or the ability to pre-
position the dolly for maintenance action can slow the process times down.  
Maintainer qualifications are also crucial to the process flow capacity. The tire 
replacement process is completed by the Navy Aviation Structural Mechanic (AM) and 
requires qualified technicians from the AM rate to complete the evolution. Tire 
maintenance requires a special qualification that takes time for the AM maintainer to 
achieve. Tire and wheel qualified maintenance personnel can affect process capacity if the 
qualified technician is not available to start work on the tire. Another maintenance 
qualification to note is the Collateral Duty Inspector (CDI). The CDI is required to perform 
an inspection of the work, once the tire and wheel qualified maintainer finishes the process, 
as shown in Figure 13.  
The data also shows where different organizations through the life of the aircraft 
have recorded up to six different maintenance steps over the two core areas that make up 
the data. To achieve a better picture of the maintenance process times, specific outlier steps 
that were listed as “four, five, six” were omitted from the process flow analysis. Omitting 
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these process steps allowed the analysis to focus on the current process the squadron uses. 
Twenty data points were omitted from the process flow data analysis. 
Unlike the proposed improvements to the POS inspection, the nose landing gear 
tire removal and replacement process do not lend itself to improvements from the 
incorporation of parallel processes. This is a result of the maintenance tasks involved with 
changing a tire being linear. Additionally, tires are assessed after every flight for 
airworthiness, but a technician is unable to predict when the tire requires replacement 
accurately. As a result, this maintenance action is responsive in nature and eliminates the 
ability to leverage pre-positioned tools and support equipment. Despite not having an 
established baseline for how much maintenance time will be required to change a nose 
landing gear tire, the average times observed in our analysis are consistent with elapsed 
maintenance time to change nose landing gear tires on similar naval aircraft.  
4. Main Landing Gear Process Flow Chart 
The process flow depicted in Figures 14 and 15 illustrates all the required 
conditions of the aircraft before removing and replacing a main landing gear tire, all 
maintenance tasks required to be completed during that maintenance action, and all 
required follow-on maintenance required to be completed before the aircraft is operational 
again. The process below has been broken down by the squadron into three core 
maintenance tasks that are depicted as steps. Those steps illustrate the average time 
required for that core maintenance function and are depicted with blue arrows delineating 
the beginning and end off a core maintenance task. Additionally, the process is illustrated 
by two distinct types of maintenance tasks: the removal of the main landing gear wheel and 
tire assembly and the installation of that assembly.
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Figure 14. Established JTD MLG Maintenance Process Flow Chart Part I. Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.). 
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Figure 15. Established JTD MLG Maintenance Process Flow Chart Part II. Adapted from Lockheed Martin (n.d.)..
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To minimize the administrative requirements involved with removing and 
replacing a main landing gear tire the squadron reduced 42 maintenance tasks requiring a 
signoff down to three core areas that are signed off by qualified maintenance technicians. 
In the specific instance of the removing and replacing a main landing gear tire, we observed 
organizations breaking down the inspection into anywhere from three total core areas to as 
many as six core areas that a maintenance technician would sign off as they progressed 
through the completion of the maintenance action. Most of the data we analyzed reflected 
three core steps, which are reflected in Figures 14 and 15. 
Our analysis of the removal and replacement of a main landing gear tire highlighted 
a clear bottleneck in the process, which was the installation portion of the maintenance 
action. The main landing gear tire removal and replacement are required when tire wear 
exceeds the allowable limits or if there are any other defects discovered on a tire that 
impacts the safety of flight. In this process, the bottleneck was identified as Step 3 and 
required, on average, 50.33 minutes to complete. For the other data elements that contained 
more than three core steps to complete, the data in those work orders also reflected the 
installation portion of the process as the bottleneck.  This maintenance action not only has 
several maintenance tasks associated with it, but also requires three specific types of 
maintenance technicians and qualifications: one APG who functions in the capacity of a 
worker, one CDI who ensures all maintenance procedures were complied with, and tire and 
wheel qualified technician who may also be one or both of the aforementioned technicians.  
The bottleneck in this process requires similar material and qualification 
requirements as the steps 1 and 2, however, it does require both a tire inflator kit and a 
qualified technician to operate it. Additionally, the installation procedure requires two 
different types of torque wrenches that must be both available for use and calibrated in 
order to complete the maintenance task. Currently, tire and wheel changes are being 
completed by AM technicians assigned to both work center 12L and work center 120 
(Airframes). As the squadron enters the workup cycle and shifts towards afloat 
maintenance operations, this maintenance action will be completed almost exclusively by 
work center 320 (Troubleshooters) on the flight deck. 
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The main landing gear tire removal and replacement process is very similar to the 
nose landing gear process and does not lend itself to improvements from the incorporation 
of parallel processes. This is a result of the maintenance tasks involved with changing a 
tire being linear. Additionally, tires are assessed after every flight for airworthiness, but a 
technician is unable to predict when the tire requires replacement accurately. As a result, 
this maintenance action is responsive and eliminates the ability to leverage pre-positioned 
tools and support equipment. Despite not having an established baseline for how much 
maintenance time will be required to change a main landing gear tire, the average times 
observed in our analysis are consistent with elapsed maintenance time to remove and 
replace landing gear tires on similar naval aircraft.  
G. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, this chapter provides an analysis of the most impactful maintenance 
degraders on the F-35C, an analysis of potential causal factors of these maintenance 
degraders, and process analysis for both corrective and preventive maintenance actions. 
Tire maintenance and POS were the focus of the analysis. After thorough analysis, the 
authors suggest a parallel process to increase the efficiency of the POS inspection. The 
analysis highlighted the impact maintenance-related degraders have on the Ao of the F-
35C platform and offered the benefits of improving the efficiency of maintenance 
processes in order to increase operational availability.  
This analysis also provides maintenance managers with a baseline for how much 
maintenance time each maintenance task requires based on historical data. Additionally, 
this research quantifies the frequency of each time a specific time of maintenance is 
performed, which is especially crucial for any maintenance that requires both repairable 
and consumable parts. This information can collectively be incorporated into cost per flight 




Throughout our analysis, a consistent theme we observed was inconsistent data 
recording. The historical maintenance data was not recorded in the same sequence of the 
required maintenance steps found in the JTD. Multiple maintenance steps were organized 
and broken into core steps to minimize the administrative completion requirements. These 
core steps that are signed off were developed locally by each squadron with the same intent. 
However, we saw variations in how many steps were required to be completed by every 
organization. The EMT shown for maintenance steps was inconsistent with several 
maintenance actions and in some cases were not part of the actual process performed. The 
variation skewed some of the EMT data as it was not clear what key task the EMT data 
was captured for. An example of this is data the authors analyzed for the POS inspection. 
Some units were completing as many as 11 steps for this inspection while most of the data 
analyzed showed seven steps that were completed for the same inspection. 
Maintenance actions were not consistent with the actions that were performed. As 
an example, when the authors analyzed the tire maintenance data, there were observed 
inconsistencies in the documentation methods by maintenance technicians. Various work 
orders that were listed as a “Tire pressure check” would have different EMTs, which were 
not consistent with a simple tire pressure check. The tire pressure check would take around 
15 minutes on average. There were elements of data that would list a tire pressure check in 
the description, but would take 60 minutes, which was consistent with an actual tire change. 
Tire pressure checks that were listed as 15 minutes of EMT were excluded from the step 
analysis, but pressure checks with elapsed maintenance times of around 60 minutes were 
categorized and analyzed as a tire removal and replacement. 
To reduce the maintenance process time, the squadron developed local 
administrative completion procedures to reduce administrative burden. The core sign-off 
tasks allow the maintenance personnel to group individual tasks and sign the group off 
before the maintenance personnel are allowed to move to the next step. The step process 
allows the maintenance personnel to move down the required task list and show the 
progress that has been made in real time. The ALIS database allows transparency which 
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enables a powerful tool for maintenance managers to monitor and manage the workload 
from the beginning to the end of each process. 
Local sign-off procedures can hinder the ability to conduct a meaningful data 
analysis once the analysis expands beyond a single organization. When there was more 
than just one squadron, data inconsistencies could occur between squadrons due to different 
maintenance practices designed around different key tasks or core components. ALIS sign-
off data is captured based on core components of the maintenance process but do not reflect 
each actual maintenance step in the JTD. Data variation will occur across different 
squadrons which could skew reported maintenance data and affect program decision 
making. Data is used to make decisions that determine manpower, resources, and capacity. 
The authors recommend that maintenance data needs to be standardized across F-35C 
squadrons by Commander, Joint Strike Fighter Wing Pacific if this data is to be leveraged 
in the future. 
The author’s recommendation of the parellel POS maintenance process could show 
potential improvement through a reduction in the total time required to complete the 
process. If the capacity of the POS inspection is increased to have a maintenance personnel 
assigned to each step, in theory, the maintenance evolution will take the time of the longest 
step with addition of two steps that will not be conducted at the same time. The POS 
inspection takes an average of 61 minutes to complete in the current form. Steps 1 through 
5 will be conducted as a parallel process and would assume the total time of the bottleneck, 
which is step 3 at 16.91 minutes. Steps 6 and 7 will be conducted after block of steps 1 
through 5 are conducted which will add 12.18 minutes to the inspection. The authors gave 
an additional 20% of EMT to alleviate confliction of maintenance personnel to total 34.91 
minutes for the POS inspection. The implementation of the new process could show a 




1. Develop Standard Operating Procedures 
A standard operating procedure that outlines the specific way for maintenance steps 
to be completed and recorded should be developed by the respective Type Wing. The Type 
Wing does not need to standardize administrative documentation procedures for every 
maintenance task, but should do so for those which impact readiness the most based off the 
methodology used in this research. Maintenance data will likely be used in the future to 
determine resource allocation to the squadrons. A standard operating procedure will align 
maintenance data to show an accurate picture of the maintenance being performed and will 
help alleviate data inconsistencies for future analysis. 
2. Reevaluate Tolerances 
Due to the high frequency of tire changes, the authors recommend the OEM re-
evaluate allowable tolerance limits on the aircraft tires. If limits are found to be too 
conservative, the frequency at which the tire is changed could be reduced which would 
lower the amount of maintenance time and costs associated with a tire change. 
3. Pre-positioning 
In order to reduce maintenance process time, the authors recommend the squadron 
pre-position required support equipment and tools for known conditional inspections. The 
known nature of preventive maintenance like the POS inspection would benefit from 
having required tools and support equipment staged prior to the aircraft requiring 
maintenance. Also, the required conditions for maintenance during the POS should be in 
place as often as equipment availability allows while the aircraft is parking and before the 
pilot shuts the aircraft down. By keeping the aircraft running, the pilot will be able to lower 
the arresting hook and open any doors that require hydraulic power. With the aircraft 
creating the hydraulic power to open the doors required for inspection, the necessity for 
support equipment would be reduced to the last steps of the inspection. 
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4. Develop a Means to Measure Squadron Maintenance Performance 
When we began on our research on this topic, we immediately sought out data that 
provided an estimate of required maintenance time and manpower per maintenance action. 
This time of information is typically found in the maintenance manuals on previous naval 
aircraft. What we discovered was that this platform contains estimated maintenance time 
and manpower requirements for Time Compliance Technical Directives (TCTD); however, 
the JTD does not provide estimated maintenance requirements for all other types of 
maintenance. The lack of an established baseline for maintenance times per maintenance 
action did not allow us to compare the actual time required against the estimated time. This 
lack of information also does not allow for maintenance managers the ability to measure a 
squadron’s effectiveness and efficiency within the F-35 community. 
In order to enable a means for maintenance managers to assess a squadron’s 
performance, it is recommended that either Navy data analysts use our methodology or a 
similar approach to establish required maintenance requirements and time to a specific 
maintenance action, or request the OEM provide estimates. 
Lastly, the authors recommend an ad hoc report be developed in ALIS to capture 
the readiness metrics of an organization. Previous naval aircraft squadrons possessed the 
ability to locally retrieve a report from Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity 
(OOMA) that provides maintenance managers with powerful readiness metrics. 
Specifically, the aforementioned ad hocs automatically calculate the following: Non-
Mission Capable Rate (Maintenance), Non-Mission Capable Rate (Supply), Partial 
Mission Capable Rate (Maintenance (Maintenance), and Partial Mission Capable Rate 
(Supply). These metrics enable maintenance managers to objectively assess their 
organization’s performance and highlight to what degree maintenance and supply are 
impacting readiness. This information can be pieced together in ALIS today, but it 
currently must be done so manually and with potential for error. Adding this capability will 
aid the Navy in better understanding where to focus their efforts to improve readiness, 
whether they be minimizing maintenance degraders or improving the global supply chain. 
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B. FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH 
Due to most of the data analyzed in this report entailing maintenance conducted in 
an ashore environment, it’s recommended that a future analysis be conducted in the 
timeframe that encompasses the beginning of VFA-147’s Optimized Fleet Readiness Plan 
(OFRP) through the duration of their scheduled deployment. This recommendation stems 
from several inherent key differences that are associated with performing aircraft 
maintenance in both an ashore and afloat operating environment.  
1. Analysis Post-deployment at Sea 
First, there are many more barriers that a squadron encounters when performing 
aircraft maintenance at sea on an aircraft carrier that are not barriers when operating ashore. 
Some examples of these barriers include the waiting times associated with getting an 
aircraft requiring maintenance from the flight deck to the hangar bay in order to commence 
a maintenance action, capacity and facility limitations of an aircraft carrier’s hangar bay, 
and the harsh conditions an aircraft is subjected to. The aforementioned environmental 
conditions range from the effects sea water has on the aircraft surfaces to the effects 
arrested landings have on not only aircraft tires, but also all of the systems on the aircraft 
that are subjected to enormous stress only encountered in an afloat environment. It’s 
unknown at this time, but historically aircraft require heightened levels of corrosion 
prevention and treatment in an afloat operating environment. The F-35C will likely 
experience a similar increase in corrosion abatement, but what’s unknown is how much 
maintenance will be required to maintain the low observability of the aircraft. Maintaining 
the low observability ashore has already proven to be challenging, but in that environment 
maintenance managers have the ability to reposition an aircraft at the time of their choosing 
and can afford having an aircraft static in the hangar for long periods of time to allow for 
the cure times associated with the hazardous material required to perform low observability 
restoration.  
2. Monitor Data Integrity 
Secondly, the Navy has never completed an Optimized Fleet Readiness Plan 
(OFRP) cycle and deployment with the F-35C before nor has it operated at sea with an 
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aircraft that requires as much data processing time to complete maintenance actions within 
ALIS. Due to the much higher op-tempo associated with aircraft maintenance and flight 
operations afloat, completing maintenance actions administratively may be extremely 
challenging if the F-35C is to meet similar timelines associated with current and previous 
similar naval strike fighters. In an attempt to meet the historical operational timelines, units 
may fall back on previous methods of documenting specific maintenance actions on paper 
and then back fitting them into the electronic database when time permits. If this process 
of documenting maintenance actions is utilized during the first OFRP cycle, it could skew 
the data in a manner that could understate the time required to appropriately maintain an 
F-35C squadron. Specifically, the same approach used and the data synthesized in this 
research will likely be used to determine future manpower requirements of the Joint Strike 
Fighter community. Therefore, it is important that data integrity be maintained both ashore 
and afloat in order to ensure squadrons are not understating the amount of time and effort 
required to support flight operations. Follow-on research of the data from the OFRP can be 
compared to our research in an effort to measure the amount of variation expended in 
maintenance time in both an ashore and afloat operating environment and truly capture 
what will be required to maintain this platform in the present and future. 
3. Standardize Documentation on Most Impactful Maintenance Actions 
The data that ALIS collects when completing maintenance actions could be a very 
powerful tool to analyze and improve maintenance processes. This type of information was 
previously unavailable for maintenance managers with this degree of fidelity, but there are 
two questions that the Navy must decide with respect to how to leverage this new 
information. 
a. Standardize Administrative Functions 
First, the Navy must determine what value they are going to place on this type of 
information. The authors observed standardization at the unit level on how each 
maintenance action was administratively completed, however, there was little 
standardization on how maintenance tasks were administratively completed across all of 
the organizations operating F-35C aircraft. This lack of standardization across all 
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organizations hinders the ability for any meaningful analysis to be completed beyond a unit 
level. If the Navy wants to leverage this information to facilitate process improvements, it 
will need to standardize how every maintenance task is broken down into administrative 
core areas (e.g., all organizations administratively complete a Post Operations Servicing 
by completing seven core tasks). 
b. Determine Benefit of Current Data Output 
Second, if the Navy determines that this type of information is not deemed 
necessary, they need to evaluate a different process for administratively completing work 
orders. Administratively completing all the required tasks in ALIS is time consuming for 
maintenance technicians. If the Navy does not want to leverage the data for process analysis 
purposes, they should evaluate a reduction in the administrative requirements for 
maintaining the F-35C. This reduction could reduce the cycle times associated with 
maintenance actions and may enable maintenance technicians more time to be spent on 
other required maintenance. 
4. Analyze the Impact Spare Parts Have on Maintenance Efficiency and 
Readiness 
Due to the limitations the authors were constrained with during this research, we 
were unable to analyze the impact spare parts availability has on F-35C maintenance 
efficiency and ultimately readiness. The authors’ observations in naval aviation throughout 
their experience highlighted the impact a shortfall of spare parts can have on an 
organization’s ability to efficiently complete requisite maintenance on aircraft. The authors 
experienced several second and third order effects of a spare parts shortfall in the F/A-18 
and E/A-18G communities, which ultimately led to negative impacts on maintenance 
efficiency due to not having a spare part when needed. These shortfalls required aviation 
maintenance organizations to frequently cannibalize parts from other aircraft in order to 
return an aircraft requiring materials to a mission capable status, which in some cases 
required twice as much time to complete a maintenance action than if a spare part had been 
available. If completed, this analysis could provide the Navy the optimal level of spare 
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parts based off failure rates while taking into consideration the constraints of the defense 
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